信息技术与国家审计质量——基于违规金额和地区生产总值的视角

基于信息技术在审计领域的不断应用和“科技强审”“审计全覆盖”的政策驱动背景，探讨信息技术和国家审计质量之间的关系。研究发现，社会信息化环境提高给国家审计质量带来了负面影响，而国家审计机关选择加大信息化投入，开展信息化建设、组织审计人员参加信息技术培训的应对策略，能显著改善社会信息化环境对审计质量带来的冲击，提高国家审计质量。当前信息技术已进入大数据时代，研究结论对国家审计机关持续开展信息化建设和加强信息技术培训提供启示；审计人员更应该提高信息化审计分析技能，提升审计效率，保证审计质量，使得信息技术更好地为国家审计工作服务。     

政府补贴促进制造业企业研发投入了吗?——基于资本结构的门槛效应研究

本文以2016~2018年沪深股市的制造业上市公司为研究样本,通过建立门槛效应模型,验证了政府补贴与企业研发投入的作用关系会随着资本结构的变化而变化。研究发现,政府补贴能够促进企业研发投入,并且在资本结构的调节作用下呈现三重门槛效应。进一步研究还发现,政府补贴对非国有企业研发投入的影响系数更高。因此,政府研发补贴政策需要综合考虑企业资金状况、企业性质,建立有效甄别机制,实施差异化补贴策略,加大对非国企补贴力度,拓宽中小企业融资渠道。     

内部控制、僵尸企业与审计特征

以2010—2017年深沪两市全部A股上市公司为研究样本，分析僵尸企业的审计特征并探讨内部控制对两者关系的调节效应。研究发现：相比于非僵尸企业，僵尸企业具有倾向于支付更低的审计费用、更有可能收到非标意见和更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计的特征，同时，僵尸企业内部控制环境更差。进一步研究发现，更高的内部控制质量使得僵尸企业更有可能收到标准无保留的审计意见，但非僵尸企业审计收费更高且更有可能选择高质量审计师。基于产权性质的进一步研究发现：（1）国有僵尸企业支付更低的审计费用，且中央国企支付的审计费用更低；（2）民营僵尸企业更有可能收到非标审计意见；（3）民营僵尸企业和地方国有僵尸企业更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计，且地方国有僵尸企业倾向性更强。从公司治理角度研究僵尸企业的审计特征，为识别僵尸企业提供了经验证据。     

政府审计、内部控制与企业创新

利用手工收集的政府审计公告数据，以2013—2017年的国有上市公司为样本，采用PSM+DID方法检验政府审计对国有上市公司创新活动的影响，并进一步根据内部控制质量和是否存在内部控制缺陷对样本进行分组检验两者之间的关系。研究结果表明：政府审计显著增加了国有上市公司的创新投入和创新产出；在内部控制质量高和不存在内部控制缺陷的样本企业中，政府审计对企业创新活动的促进作用更加显著。     

乡镇政府财务管理的常见问题及完善策略

乡镇政府是我国的基层单位,其开展的工作与我国广大群众的生活息息相关,与人民的利益也是紧密相连的。因此,乡镇政府财务管理工作极其重要,甚至影响着集体的进步与发展。但现实生活中,乡镇政府财务管理存在着很多问题,这些都需要引起我们的重视。论文详细列举乡镇政府财务管理存在的问题,并且就这些问题提出一些相应的、科学的解决方法与措施。     

Parties,divided government,and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence from U.S. states

This paper examines the impact of parties and divided government on infrastructure expenditures for transportation, education, and social services in U.S. states. As infrastructure expenditures are considered a bi-partisan priority, we hypothesize that divided governments expand infrastructure spending compared to governments under true Democratic or Republican control. We test this hypothesis using U.S. state-level data over the period 1970 to 2008 and find that divided governments indeed increase expenditures for these budget categories. Specifically, divided governments spend more on transportation than unified Democratic governments, and more on education and social services than unified Republican governments. The effect is most pronounced for the core infrastructure of transportation and even stronger when only looking at capital outlays instead of total expenditures.     

General or central government? Empirical evidence on political cycles in budget composition using new data for OECD countries

Previous studies used general government data to examine whether national governments’ electoral motives and ideology influenced budget composition in OECD countries. General government data includes, however, the state and local level. Using new data for general and central government over the period 1995–2016, I reexamine political cycles in budget composition. The results suggest that, both at the general and central government level, leftwing governments spent more on education and less on public services than rightwing governments. Defense expenditure was somewhat lower under leftwing than rightwing governments and in election years; especially in federal states. Effects of government ideology on the individual expenditure categories are larger at the central than general government level. Scholars need to re-examine results on ideology-induced effects that have been derived from general government data where central government data should have been used.     

Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities

Recently several countries have experienced a drop in popularity of national political parties, accompanied by the success of independent movements (e.g. “Civic Lists” in Italy). I exploit the success of “Civic Lists” in Italian municipalities and use them as a comparison group for party-affiliated politicians, to test whether national parties affect fiscal discipline. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), I show that party-affiliated mayors are more fiscally responsible: they run lower deficits, accumulate less debt and reduce expenditures. The effect is significant only for municipalities not constrained by fiscal rules. This suggests that national parties act as a substitute for fiscal rules in constraining politicians. Besides, I provide evidence that the discipline of party-affiliated politicians is linked to better career prospects: party-affiliated mayors have a higher probability of being re-elected and better chances of being promoted to higher levels of government. Alternative stories find less support in the data.     

Optimum government size and economic growth in case of Indian states: Evidence from panel threshold model

This paper investigates the relationship between optimum government size and economic growth using data of Indian states during 1990-91 to 2017–18. Our results derived from panel threshold regression model show a positive and significant impact of government size on economic growth within the estimated thresholds for both aggregate and sub-panels based on income and regions. Once the government size moves above the upper threshold level, then its impact declines and turns to be insignificant. Thus, our findings suggest the policymakers for maintaining the government size within the thresholds limit.     

Government contracts and US bond yield spreads: A study on costs and benefits of materialized political connections

In a 1991–2013 sample of bonds issued by US public firms, we find that the cost of debt (yield spread relative to comparable Treasuries) of suppliers to government agencies is contingent on the strategic importance of the supplier's industry. The yield spreads for strategically unimportant government suppliers are higher than for firms that are not government suppliers. If government contracts serve as tangible evidence of political connections, these higher yield spreads indicate that weaker corporate governance as a cost of political connections outweighs the benefits of said connections. For the subsample of government suppliers from strategically important industries, where the benefits of implicit bailout guarantees and revenue stability outweigh the corporate governance problems, the cost of debt is lower than for firms that are not government suppliers. The higher (lower) cost of debt for strategically unimportant (strategically important) suppliers is confined to contracting with the federal government. Our findings are robust to alternative variable and sample specifications, and to endogeneity concerns.